Greg shares a biblical and logical perspective on determinism, arguing that moral accountability and common sense point to the existence of free will.
Transcript
Question: Many scientists are claiming that free will is simply a concept but not a reality. What does the Bible have to say discussing free will as a reality-based truth statement?
Greg: I think this is an area that is misunderstood by scientists and non-scientists—theologians. I think there’s a lot of confusion about this. Part of the problem is that it’s not entirely clear how best to define free will, and there are different ways to do this. Although, there’s a commonsense notion that free will entails decisions that are my own. I make the decision for my own reasons. They are not determined. The decision is not determined by anything, and therefore I get to decide. And reasons are the things in virtue of which we decide, but they aren’t the things that compel or cause the decision that we make. I mean, that’s a pretty commonsense notion when we think about freedom.
Now, the question is, do we have such freedom? So, here’s the question I ask of science in light of what I just described: Did the scientists come to a conclusion on their own—without being forced—that we are determined and don’t have free will? It’s a fair question. If we are determined, they cannot come to a conclusion on their own as a matter of discursive reasoning that brings them to the conclusion that there is no freedom, because all of those actions would have looked like free acts of decision-making, and concluding something based on evidence would really have been determined by the physical situation or circumstances that came before it.
Think of dominoes falling. It’s the simplest way to think of it. A domino in a line of dominoes falls because a different domino is falling against it. Then it strikes the next domino, which then continues the sequence. If we are determined, we are merely a domino. We are struck by other causes—other events—that cause us to do something, which then causes other events. We are not making any more actual decisions than a domino is. We can’t step out of the line. We can’t choose to resist the one domino that’s falling and therefore not strike the other one. We are simply pieces of the machine. It’s machine-like behavior.
Now, if physicalism is true—that is, all there are are dominoes—molecules in motion governed by natural law (notice the language: governed by natural law)—then our actions are governed by natural law, not by acts of will. And if our actions are governed by natural law, I don’t know why anyone thinks that we should be either praised or blamed for anything. The domino does not get praised for being struck by another domino nor blamed for striking the next domino. It just happens. It’s a causal chain that cannot be interrupted by any physical force, except maybe some other intervening physical force that is just a different line of dominoes falling in a different direction that creates a different causal chain. Point being, if physicalism is true—which is what a lot of scientists hold to be true—then we are in a causally closed universe. There is no agency. God’s not around as an external agent outside of the universe to influence it, and there are no individuals that are making choices. We are just falling dominoes. So, everything is determined. But if everything is determined, you could never know that. You would only believe it because you were determined by prior necessary and sufficient physical causes to believe that, while somebody else—by the same set of circumstances—ended up believing some alternate thing by the prior causes in their life. So, we only have different beliefs because the dominoes are falling in different sequences. Consequently, we have different kinds of effects, but there still is no freedom. So, the idea of determinism is inherent to physicalistic systems in a closed system.
By the way, if physical systems were not determined, science wouldn’t work. That’s where you get the notion of scientific repeatability. Things happen over and over again the same way because you’re setting the dominoes up in the same order, and that’s how you can infer causality and certain principles of actions and causes and stuff like that—uniform behaviors of the natural realm—because you keep setting things up the same way, and then all the dominoes fall in exactly the same fashion. Experimental repeatability. But, of course, you can’t have an experiment unless somebody sets the experiment up—someone who is not himself or herself a mere effect of other causes but is an agent—has to set up the experiment to then learn from the experiment something true about the nature of the universe.
Now, notice I introduced another concept there: an agent. So, there are two types of causation in the world. There is event causation—dominoes. One domino as an event falling against another domino, creating another event, falling against another domino, etc.—event causation. But, notice, if all the dominoes are set up, you’re not going to have anything fall anywhere unless the first domino is flicked. Once someone—an agent—starts the causal chain, then something happens. See, that’s the unique thing about an agent, is that an agent can initiate a causal chain and is not just simply a piece in a causal chain—a series of cause and effects.
If determinism is true, there’s no agency, even though we feel like we’re agents. We’re thinking and causing and choosing not to do things and choosing to do others, which makes praise and blame appropriate for free individuals who could determine what they do. It’s up to them. No, if that isn’t there, then we’re just dominoes.
Now, it seems obvious that we’re agents. Simple reflection tells us that. We initiate things. I’m deciding what to say here. I’m picking my pen up now, and I’m making a note about something because this is what I am choosing to do. And I have no reason to believe otherwise. I’m an agent. But if somebody is committed to physicalism to try to squeeze all these occult forces—these hidden, dark, mysterious things, the “ghost in the machine” kind of idea, that human machines have souls, all that spooky stuff, that silly stuff—well, then, you’re stuck with physicalism, which means you’re stuck with determinism, which means you don’t think at all—not in the way that we think about thinking. You’re not independently doing anything. You’re not coming to any conclusions. You’re just responding to prior causes.
So, scientists are right: If physicalism is true, there is no freedom. But there is freedom—obviously. Therefore, physicalism is not true. It’s that simple.
Now, what does the Bible have to say about this? Well, the Bible says a couple of things. The Bible never says, “God will never violate your free will.” Never says that. People say that all the time. “Well, God would never violate your free will.” Actually, there’s a lot in the Bible that indicates quite the opposite—that God determines particular things to happen. Now, that’s kind of a web, and sometimes it’s hard to figure all of this out. And I think some of it can’t be figured out. But, nevertheless, free will is not sacrosanct in the Bible. But it is clear that free choices—in the commonsense understanding of the term—are being made, and people are held morally responsible for their choices one way or another. They’re either punished for bad choices, or they are praised and rewarded for good choices. This is in the Bible.
So, all of these things entail some robust understanding of freedom. Humans are not machines—they’re agents in the Bible. Even though it doesn’t use the language of “free will,” I don’t think, it still presumes freedom in all kinds of aspects. The Bible does not represent a deterministic, machine-like universe in which we are all simply cogs in the wheels of the machinery of the universe.
That having been said, though, it does seem clear that there are things that God determines to take place. There are certain ends that he guarantees will happen. And sometimes these ends intersect with human will. Salvation is an example of that. Now, of course, there’s a debate on this. But those who are saved are called “the chosen” and are called “the elect.” Those are the biblical words that are used to describe them. Now, it seems—on a commonsense understanding of the words “chosen” and “elect”—that there is a chooser, and there is one who’s receiving the choosing. There is an elector, and one who is elected. So, there does seem to be a commonsense understanding that some things happen in our lives because God decided they’re going to happen, and maybe one of those things is salvation—that God is responsible for rescuing us. We don’t rescue ourselves in any way, shape, or form.
Now, there’s a debate on that between Arminians and Calvinists—or Reformed folk—and it’s a legitimate debate. It’s a noble distinction that people make, and there are good people on either side. I set up on one side of that discussion. But the point I’m making is that there are some things that everybody agrees that God has determined will ultimately take place—the final consequence or the disposition of the saved and the unsaved, Heaven and Hell, and events that will take place to bring about God’s purposes, the advent of Messiah, the suffering of Jesus—all carried out according to the predetermined plan of God. That’s the language the text uses. “God has predestined those who believe in him to become conformed to the image of his Son.” So, there are things that, of a certainty, will take place, regardless of what human beings choose, because God has destined those things to happen.
Now, here’s the key point: Just because God has destined some things to happen—and there’s a difference of opinion on what those things are (those are the different theological camps)—doesn’t mean the universe is a machine and human beings are robots. It doesn’t mean that at all, because there can be some things that are secured—the ends are secured, predetermined by God—but other things that we’re perfectly free to do. And that’s not a problem.